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MADDEN V. MIDLAND FUNDING LLC: UPROOTING THE
NATIONAL BANK ACT’S POWER OF PREEMPTION
ANDREW SILVIA *
I. INTRODUCTION
Consumer lending in New York, Connecticut, and Vermont and the
securitization thereof may soon deteriorate after the United States Supreme
Court balked at the chance to uphold more than 150 years of banking law
precedent. To facilitate an active lending market for consumers, nationally
chartered banks originate loans and market those loans to investors in the
secondary marketplace. This allows the bank to liquefy their debts and
redeploy capital in the form of new loans while remaining within their federally-mandated capital requirements. The more investors in the secondary
market and the greater access to those investors that national banks have,
the more consumers can obtain loans for personal or business use. Unfortunately, the mechanics of this market have frozen up in the wake of the decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (“Second
Circuit”) in Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC (“Madden”). 1 This decision
challenges the doctrine of federal preemption of state usury law under the
National Bank Act (“NBA”), which has the potential to significantly disrupt the secondary market and national bank lending.
The Second Circuit held that the interest charged by a national bank at
a rate up to the bank’s home state usury limit does not preempt another
state’s usury laws when that loan is sold or assigned, despite the guarantee
of federal preemption under the NBA. 2 Specifically, the Second Circuit
held that a national bank’s power of preemption did not extend to Midland
Funding LLC (“Midland Funding”) because Midland Funding is not a national bank nor a subsidiary or agent of a national bank and, therefore, is
subject to its home state usury laws on any loans in which it maintains an
interest. 3 This decision uproots decades of legal precedent and industry
standards that have sustained the doctrine of federal preemption under the
* J.D. Candidate 2017, Chicago-Kent College of Law.
1. See Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2015).
2. Id. at 249.
3. Id.
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NBA. The secondary market depends on federal preemption standards
when investors purchase loans originated by national banks; and the national bank depends on these standards to create a liquid market for its loan
originations. However, with the Second Circuit’s decision in Madden, the
secondary market has not only frozen up, but secondary market investors
and loan purchasers that own what they believed to be non-usurious loans
may now be subject to civil and criminal usury charges. This has created
urgency and panic throughout the market as indicated by the following
headlines:
“Peer-to-Peer Lenders Face Legal Blow in Usury Ruling” 4; “A New Tariff on ‘Interest-Rate Exports?’” 5; “Are Changes Coming To The P2P
Lending Model?” 6; “Is marketplace lending cooling off? Regulatory
scrutiny impacts alternative lending’s growth” 7; “Don’t Let Outdated
Laws Shackle Credit Innovation” 8; “Fitch: Challenges Linger as U.S.
Marketplace Lending ABS Rises” 9; “Moody’s: Federal appeals court ruling on Madden v. Midland is credit negative for marketplace lending
ABS” 10; “Madden v. Midland Has Already Hurt Riskier Borrowers,
Study Finds” 11; “Supreme Court Won’t Hear Madden Case, Leaving
Unanswered Question about Competing State Laws” 12; “Finance Alert:
The Uncertain Legacy of Madden.” 13

4. Matt Scully, Peer-to-Peer Lenders Face Legal Blow in Usury Ruling, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 14,
2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-08-14/peer-to-peer-lenders-losing-court-battleover-state-usury-laws.
5. Peter Rudegeair, A New Tariff on ‘Interest-Rate Exports?’, WALL ST. J.: MONEYBEAT (June
30, 2015), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2015/06/30/a-new-tariff-on-interest-rate-exports/.
6. Jayson Derrick, Are Changes Coming To The P2P Lending Model?, BENZINGA (Sept. 29,
2015),
http://www.benzinga.com/analyst-ratings/analyst-color/15/09/5873715/are-changes-coming-to-the-p2plending-model.
7. Lisa Valentine, Marketplace Lending Cools Off: Regulatory Scrutiny Is Impacting the Growth
of Alternative Lending, BANKING EXCHANGE, Oct.–Nov. 2015, at 10.
8. Brian Knight, Don’t Let Outdated Laws Shackle Credit Innovation, AM. BANKER (July 28,
2015),
http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink/dont-let-outdated-laws-shackle-credit-innovation1075677-1.html.
9. Fitch: Challenges Linger as U.S. Marketplace Lending ABS Rises, REUTERS (Sept. 10, 2015),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/10/idUSFit93292920150910.
10. Announcement: Moody’s: Federal appeals court ruling on Madden v. Midland is credit
(July
20,
2015),
negative
for
marketplace
lending
ABS,
MOODY’S
https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-Federal-appeals-court-ruling-on-Madden-v-Midland-is—
PR_330508.
11. Sean Murray, Madden v Midland Has Already Hurt Riskier Borrowers, Study Finds,
DEBANKED (May 28, 2016), http://debanked.com/2016/05/madden-v-midland-has-already-hurt-riskierborrowers-study-finds/.
12. Supreme Court Won’t Hear Madden Case, Leaving Unanswered Question about Competing
State Laws, ACA INTERNATIONAL (June 29, 2016), http://www.acainternational.org/iap-supreme-courtwont-hear-madden-case-leaving-unanswered-question-about-competing-state-laws-40090.aspx.
13. Henry G. Morriello et al., Finance Alert: The Uncertain Legacy of Madden, KAYE SCHOLER
LLP (June 28, 2016), http://www.kayescholer.com/in-the-market/publications/client_alerts/2016-06-28-
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Indeed, various banking and securities associations have raised serious
concerns about the impact of the Second Circuit’s decision. Amicus briefs
were filed with the Second Circuit by the American Bankers Association,
Independent Community Bankers of America, California Bankers Association, Utah Bankers Association, 14 the Clearing House Association, 15 Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association, and the Structured
Finance Industry Group, Inc. 16 Conspicuously absent was an amicus brief
from the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”)—the federal
agency that charters and regulates all national banks. 17 Although there may
have been discussions within the OCC to file an amicus brief, for some
reason, the OCC decided against it. Nevertheless, these organizations have
raised concerns that the precedential effect of the decision in Madden could
present significant problems for the financial services industry.
The Second Circuit’s holding has influenced decision making not only
by banks and depository institutions, but also hedge funds, securitization
vehicles, buyers of defaulted debt, purchasers of whole loans, and other
purchasers of loans originated by national banks. 18 The implications are
widespread for lenders and borrowers. Indeed, as of March 31, 2015, those
institutions insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”)
held over $8 trillion in outstanding loans. 19 Because this decision affects
many key players in the financial services industry, it requires a detailed
analysis of the Second Circuit’s holding in light of legal precedent and how
the market should interpret this holding. This note will address the history
of the NBA and the concept of federal preemption embedded within the
NBA in Section II, the analysis of the Second Circuit’s decision in Madden
in Section III, and the implications going forward in Section IV.
finance-alert-the-uncertain-legacy-of-madden/_pdf/Template=pdf/2016-06-28-finance-alert-theuncertain-legacy-of-madden.pdf.
14. Brief of the Am. Bankers Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2015) (No. 142131) [hereinafter ABA brief].
15. Brief of the Clearing House Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2015) (No. 14-2131).
16. Brief of the Structured Fin. Indus. Group, Inc., and the Sec. Indus. and Fin. Markets Ass’n as
Amici Curiae in Support of Defendants-Appellees’ Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing
En Banc, Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2015) (No. 14-2131).
17. See Gen. Docket, Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit at 11, Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786
F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2015) (No. 14-02131).
18. Stephen F.J. Ornstein et al., Second Circuit’s Madden v Midland Decision Could Upend
Secondary Credit Markets, ALSTON & BIRD (Sept. 2, 2015), https://www.alston.com//media/files/insights/publications/2015/09/ifinancial-services—products—financial-services/files/viewadvisory-as-pdf/fileattachment/15135-madden-v-midland.pdf.
19. Brief of the Clearing House Ass’n et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc, supra note 15, at 11.
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Midland Funding moved for a rehearing with the Second Circuit on
June 19, 2015, but that motion was denied by the Second Circuit on August
12, 2015. 20 Midland Funding filed a petition for certiorari with the United
States Supreme Court on November 10, 2015. 21 Amicus briefs were filed
with the U.S. Supreme Court by the Clearing House Association LLC,
ACA International, the Structured Finance Industry Group, and the American Bankers Association. 22 The U.S. Solicitor General was also asked to
submit a brief on behalf of the United States, which was submitted to the
Court on May 24, 2016. 23 The Solicitor General noted that the Second Circuit erred in holding that state usury laws may validly prohibit a national
bank’s assignee from enforcing the interest-rate set by the national bank up
to the level of the state in which it is located. 24 However, the Solicitor General argued the Court should deny the petition because there was no split
among the circuit courts at the time and the Solicitor General believed that
Midland Funding would prevail on remand after presenting the key aspects
of the preemption analysis. 25
Based on the Solicitor General’s recommendation, the Court denied
the petition for certiorari on June 27, 2016. 26 This surprising move by the
Court leaves in place the decision of the Second Circuit, which will now
subject national banks located in New York, Connecticut, and Vermont to a
different standard than other national banks. For national banks outside the
Second Circuit’s jurisdiction, the inherent uncertainty of whether or not
their own courts will make a similar decision has caused them to reevaluate
their common lending practices. Only time will tell whether courts will
adopt a similar mandate and disregard the federal preemption right of national banks or whether the courts will uphold the right of national banks,
thus creating a split among the jurisdictions. The wait and see approach
taken by the Solicitor General and the Court will undoubtedly affect the
lending marketplace for an indefinite period of time.

20. Ornstein et al., supra note 18.
21. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Midland Funding, LLC v. Madden, 136 S.Ct. 2505 (No. 1500610).
22. See Court Docket, Midland Funding, LLC v. Madden, 136 S.Ct. 2505 (No. 15-00610).
23. See Court Docket, Midland Funding, LLC v. Madden, 136 S.Ct. 2505 (No. 15-00610).
24. Brief of the United States as Amici Curiae at 5–6, Midland Funding, LLC v. Madden, 136
S.Ct. 2505 (No. 15-00610) [hereinafter United States brief].
25. United States brief, supra note 24, at 6.
26. See Court Docket, Midland Funding, LLC v. Madden, 136 S.Ct. 2505 (No. 15-00610).
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II. HISTORY OF THE NBA AND THE VALID-WHEN-MADE DOCTRINE
A. History of the NBA
The NBA, enacted in 1864, created “a federal free banking regime,
with federally chartered banks issuing a uniform national currency.” 27 Even
though the federal government withdrew from the banking system altogether in 1846, the rise of specie currency 28 created the need for the U.S.
Treasury to develop a new national banking system. 29 President Abraham
Lincoln’s Treasury Secretary, Salmon P. Chase, believed that a national
system would alleviate the problems with specie currency and that by creating a federal system the majority of state banks would convert to federally
chartered banks. 30 Despite state banks’ reservations that this was evidence
of an expanding federal state, this proposal was popular with the public
who viewed a national bank as necessary to finance the Civil War and it
created assurance that the notes currently in the market were worth what
they portended to be worth. 31 Congress enacted the National Currency Act
in 1863, which established the national currency of the United States, and
was subsequently refined in the National Bank Act of 1864. The growth of
national banks, however, did not come from state banks converting to federally chartered banks. Most state banks remained state banks and national
charters were obtained by newly established, or de novo, banks. 32
As an incentive for becoming a nationally chartered bank, these new
national banks were given the benefit of federal preemption to give them an
advantage over their state competitors. 33 Federal preemption under the
NBA is codified in Title 12 of the United States Code in Section 85, which
indicates that “[a]ny association may. . .charge on any loan or. . .other evidences of debt, interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the State, Territory, or District where the bank is located.” 34 For purposes of Section 85, a
national bank is “located in the State named in its organization certificate.” 35 The OCC has promulgated regulations that allow a national bank to
“make, sell. . .or otherwise deal in loans. . .subject to such
27. Jonathan R. Macey, Geoffrey P. Miller & Richard Scott Carnell, BANKING LAW AND
REGULATION 11 (Aspen Publishers, 3d ed. 2001).
28. Specie currency means a currency that is in coin, as opposed to paper money or soft money.
29. Macey, supra note 27, at 10–11.
30. Macey, supra note 27.
31. Macey, supra note 27.
32. Macey, supra note 27.
33. Marquette Nat’l Bank v. First of Omaha Service Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 314 (1978).
34. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (2006).
35. First of Omaha Service Corp., 439 U.S. 310.
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terms. . .prescribed by. . .Federal law,” 36 and to make such loans “without
regard to state law limitations concerning. . .rates of interest.” 37 This statutory and regulatory text permits a national bank to export rates that are
permitted by its home state when dealing with customers from other states,
even when those rates are higher than the state laws would otherwise permit. 38
State usury laws were originally enacted to protect borrowers, particularly individual consumers, from unreasonably high interest rates. However, branches and subsidiaries of national banks have traditionally relied on
the doctrine of federal preemption to avoid the tapestry of state usury laws
and apply the interest rates otherwise allowed under the NBA. 39 Indeed, the
U.S. Supreme Court has suggested that this preemption may extend beyond
national bank entities in certain circumstances where either the entity is
acting as an equivalent of a national bank with the usual powers or where
the application of state law would “significantly interfere with a national
bank’s ability to exercise its power under the NBA.” 40 This preemption
power under the NBA has “been interpreted for over a century to give ‘advantages to National Banks over their State competitors.’” 41
B. Valid When Made Doctrine
While state usury laws vary from state to state, the U.S. Supreme
Court in Nichols v. Fearson suggested that there are two cardinal rules in
the doctrine of usury: (1) to constitute usury, there must be a loan between
the parties; and (2) that a contract, which at its inception is not subject to
usury laws, cannot be invalidated by any subsequent usurious transactions. 42 The Court reasoned that if a contract, which is made in a legal and
non-usurious manner, is sold to another party that would then be subject to
usury laws and thus render the contract for the loan null and void, then the
purchaser would have purchased a valueless item and the debtor would be
discharged of a debt he justly owes to another. 43 This produces a senseless
result. This principle of usury law, often referred to as the Valid-When36. 12 C.F.R. § 7.4008(a) (2014).
37. 12 C.F.R. § 7.4008(d) (2014).
38. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 4, Midland Funding, LLC v. Madden, 136 S.Ct. 2505 (No.
15-00610).
39. 12 U.S.C. § 1831d(a) (2006).
40. Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246, 250 (2d Cir. 2015).
41. Marquette Nat’l Bank v. First of Omaha Service Corp., 439 U.S. 299, 314 (1978) (quoting
Tiffany v. Nat’l Bank of Mo., 85 U.S. 409, 413 (1874)).
42. Nichols v. Fearson, 32 U.S. 103, 109 (1833).
43. Id. at 110
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Made doctrine, suggests that if the loan is not usurious when it is made,
then it does not become usurious when it is assigned to another party. 44
The Valid-When-Made doctrine was further applied by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in 1981 when it noted that
“[t]he non-usurious character of a note should not change when the note
changes hands.” 45 Instead of subjecting every subsequent transaction to
state usury laws, the courts have interpreted this as an assignment of a right
whereby “the assignee steps into the shoes of the assignor, assuming his
rights as well as his duties. . .whatever the shoe size.” 46 The contractual
right of assignment requires an assignor’s intent to transfer the property or
instrument, which extinguishes the assignor’s right to performance and
assigns that power to the assignee. 47 This is what happens when a loan is
sold into the secondary market. The purchaser steps into the shoes of the
originator of the loan and is given full contractual rights to the loan.
This interpretation of contractual assignment has created another problem in deciding whether the bank maintains a contractual right or a real
interest in the loan as the originator, or whether its right is extinguished and
why that matters for usury laws. Consider that when a bank assigns all its
rights to a second party, it does not maintain any further interest in the loan
and the transaction would be considered a typical sale or assignment. This
sale to the secondary market is what the Second Circuit deemed problematic in Madden and why the state usury law would apply. However, if the
bank maintains some interest in the loan, and sells, for instance, only a
participation interest in the loan, then usury law may not be applied to the
sale. In Krispin v. May Department Stores in 2000, the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit addressed this issue when dealing with an
assignment of credit card debt from a department store to a subsidiary
bank. 48 The court held that because the bank was the real party in interest
by setting the terms of the agreement and not the store, the bank was not
subject to the state usury law where it was not located. 49 Because this assignment implicated the NBA, the bank was able to maintain the interest
rights under assignment and exercise its powers as a national bank under
federal preemption.

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Ornstein et al., supra note 18, at 1.
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Lattimore Land Corp., 656 F.2d 139, 148–49 (5th Cir. 1981).
Olvera v. Blitt & Gaines, P.C., 431 F.3d 285, 288–89 (7th Cir. 2005).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 317 (WESTLAW 1981).
Krispin v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 218 F.3d 919, 921 (8th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 924.
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Whenever a national bank originates a non-usurious loan, the ValidWhen-Made doctrine is implicated and the NBA supports the application of
federal preemption to the terms of that loan whenever it is sold or assigned.
Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that where Congress has not explicitly granted a power on the states to regulate and limit banking activities, national banks should not be subject to such limitations. 50 Under the
NBA, national banks have the power to make and sell loans so that they
may further liquefy their debts and redeploy capital to make additional
loans. 51 Indeed, “[t]he entire secondary market for credit relies on the Valid-When-Made doctrine to enforce credit agreements pursuant to their
terms.” 52 The purpose of having a competitive and easily accessible secondary market is to have the opportunity to make more loans and expand
the availability of credit, which benefits consumers. 53
The ability of national banks to exercise “all such incidental powers as
shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking,” 54 as guaranteed in
the NBA has now come under scrutiny by the Second Circuit in Madden.
This decision has contradicted decades of precedent and seemingly ignored
the Valid-When-Made doctrine. Interestingly, the Valid-When-Made doctrine was not even mentioned in the Madden opinion. 55 Because the U.S.
Supreme Court denied Midland Funding’s petition, the Second Circuit’s
decision in Madden is the controlling authority within its jurisdiction and it
has caused uncertainty in the lending marketplace. Current market participants within the Second Circuit’s jurisdiction are left to analyze the Second
Circuit’s decision and adjust their lending business to remain in compliance.
III. ANALYSIS OF MADDEN V. MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC
A. Facts of the Case
In 2005, the plaintiff, Saliha Madden, opened a credit card account
with Bank of America, a national bank organized under the laws of the
state of Delaware and not subject to New York state usury law. Bank of
America’s credit card program shortly thereafter was consolidated into
50. Barnett Bank of Marion Cty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 34–35 (1996).
51. ABA brief, supra note 14, at 3.
52. BUCKLEY SANDLER LLP, SPECIAL ALERT: SECOND CIRCUIT DECISION THREATENS TO UPSET
SECONDARY CREDIT MARKETS 3, http://www.buckleysandler.com/uploads/1082/doc/Special-Alert-reMadden-v-Midland_Funding_LLC.pdf.
53. See ABA brief, supra note 14, at 11.
54. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2006).
55. BUCKLEY SANDLER LLP, supra note 52, at 2.
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another national bank, FIA Card Services (“FIA”), which was also organized under the laws of the state of Delaware. 56 By 2008, the plaintiff owed
$5,000 on her account. 57 FIA ultimately wrote off her debt as uncollectable
and sold the debt to the defendant, Midland Funding, a non-depository debt
purchaser. 58 Midland Funding is not a national bank and neither FIA nor
Bank of America maintained any participatory interest in the loan after it
was sold to Midland Funding. 59 In November 2010, Midland Funding sent
a letter to the plaintiff to collect the outstanding debt under the terms of the
lending agreement, which included an interest rate of twenty-seven percent
per year, 60 a rate that is permissible under Delaware law, but not New York
law. 61
A year later, the plaintiff filed a class action lawsuit against Midland
Funding alleging that Midland Funding had engaged in abusive and unfair
debt collection practices in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act (“FDCPA”). 62 Furthermore, and of greater precedential concern for
national banks, the plaintiff alleged that Midland Funding charged a usurious rate of interest in violation of New York civil and criminal law, 63
which requires that the interest charged on any loan must not exceed twenty-five percent per year. 64 The class to which the plaintiff alleges to be a
part of includes 49,780 people who received a similar debt collection letter
from Midland Funding. 65
The District Court stated at trial that if the plaintiff could show that
FIA assigned the debt to Midland Funding, then the plaintiff’s allegations
would fail because the NBA would preempt any state law usury claim
against Midland Funding. 66 Furthermore, if these facts were proven, then
the plaintiff’s claim under the FDCPA should also fail because the interest
rates would be permitted. 67 The plaintiff confirmed that she received the
terms of the lending agreement and that the terms were subject to Delaware
56. Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246, 247–48, 250 (2d Cir. 2015).
57. Id. at 248.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 253.
62. Id. at 248; Corrected Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant at 4, Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC,
786 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2015) (No. 14-02131) [hereinafter Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant]; see generally 15
U.S.C. § 1692e (2006) (“A debt collector may not use any false, deceptive, or misleading representation
or means in connection with the collection of any debt”).
63. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.40 (CONSOL. 2015); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-501 (CONSOL. 2015).
64. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 190.40 (CONSOL. 2015).
65. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 62, at 4.
66. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d at 248.
67. Id.
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law, but the complaint alleged violations of New York usury law, which
left the plaintiff without a valid claim under New York usury law. 68 Therefore, on May 30, 2014, the parties to the case entered into a Stipulation for
Entry of Judgment for Defendants for Purpose of Appeal, which stipulated
that the FIA had assigned the debt to Midland Funding. 69 Because this stipulation removed the issues of fact, the District Court granted a final judgment for Midland Funding. 70 The Honorable Cathy Seibel of the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York held that “‘assignees should be afforded the same protections as those given to the bank
itself with regard to charging a particular interest rate.’” 71
On appeal to the Second Circuit, the court held:
[T]he District Court erred in holding that NBA preemption bars her
state-law usury claims. . .Because neither defendant is a national bank
nor a subsidiary or agent of a national bank, or is otherwise acting on behalf of a national bank, and because application of the state law on which
Madden’s claims rely would not significantly interfere with any national
bank’s ability to exercise its powers under the NBA, we reverse the District Court’s holding that the NBA preempts Madden’s claims and accordingly vacate the judgment of the District Court. 72

The Second Circuit’s reasoning can be broken down into the following two principles: (1) Midland Funding is not a national bank, nor a subsidiary or agent of a national bank; and (2) the application of state law in
this instance would not “significantly interfere” with the national bank’s
powers under the NBA. 73
B. Originator or Possessor: Who is the focus of usury law?
There is no argument that Midland Funding is not a national bank, nor
a subsidiary or agent thereof; however, that has not traditionally been the
inquiry when the secondary market considers its legal protections. The
inquiry is traditionally whether or not the loan was originated by a national
bank, which is subject to the protections of the NBA and was deemed nonusurious at the time it was originated.
The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that there is a universal principle
that a contract, free from usury laws at its inception, shall not be deemed
68. Brief for Defendants-Appellees at 1, Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246 (2d
Cir. 2015) (No. 14-02131) [hereinafter Brief for Defendants-Appellees].
69. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d at 249.
70. Id.
71. Brief for Defendants-Appellees, supra note 68, at 5 (quoting R. on Appeal at A-109).
72. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d at 249.
73. Id.
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invalid due to any subsequent usurious transaction. 74 This is one of the two
cardinal rules of usury law that has been maintained throughout the history
of the NBA’s application. 75 Despite this cardinal rule, the Second Circuit
pointed to a bulletin from the OCC that clarified that “third party debt buyers are distinct from agents or subsidiaries of a national bank.” 76 The guidance from the OCC is meant to provide advice to banks regarding the risk
associated with selling loans to third party debt buyers, but this guidance
focuses more on the reputational, operational, compliance, and strategic
risks associated with selling loans to third party debt buyers and the way
those buyers conduct their business, which may have a negative impact on
the bank. 77 Aside from the bulletin advising banks to “comply with applicable laws and regulations,” 78 this bulletin falls short of warning banks that
state usury laws could override the federal preemption status on loans they
originated. Therefore, even though the Second Circuit and the appellant
raised the point that third party debt collectors are not operating subsidiaries or bank servicers or agents of a bank and are, therefore, not subject to
the same regulations as banks are, 79 this should be of no consequence regarding a loan that was originated by a national bank. However, the Second
Circuit seems to have adopted the appellant’s position that the extension of
the NBA’s preemptive powers is proper only when the debt buyer is a subsidiary of the national bank or the national bank retains some interest in the
accounts. 80
The Second Circuit disagreed with the appellee’s reliance on two cases in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit where the
court upheld federal preemption. In Phipps v. FDIC, a bank originated
loans and then sold those loans to the other defendants in the case for a
fee. 81 The court held that these fees were properly considered interest under
the NBA and concluded that the court “must look at ‘the originating entity
(the bank), and not the ongoing assignee . . . in determining whether the
NBA applies.’” 82 The Second Circuit, however, stated that Phipps was
74. Nichols v. Fearson, 32 U.S. 103, 106 (1833).
75. Id. at 109.
76. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d at 250.
77. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC BULL. NO. 2014-37, CONSUMER
DEBT SALES (Aug. 4, 2014).
78. OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC BULL. NO. 2014-37, CONSUMER
DEBT SALES (Aug. 4, 2014).
79. See Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d at 251–52; Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 62,
at 19.
80. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 62, at 11.
81. Phipps v. FDIC, 417 F.3d 1006, 1009 (8th Cir. 2005).
82. Id. at 1013 (quoting Krispin v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 218 F.3d 919, 924 (8th Cir. 2000)).
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distinguishable from Madden because Madden involves interest charged
after the account was sold by FIA to Midland Funding. 83 Would the court
be more inclined to accept the guiding principle in Phipps if the appellant
in Madden had raised this issue when Bank of America sold the loan to
FIA? If we were to accept the Second Circuit’s interpretation, we would
never know at what point during the origination and assignment of the loan
that the loan would become usurious.
The appellant argued that the point at which a rate of interest is usurious should be when the rate is actually charged against the customer, rather
than when the loan is made. 84 This standard would thus focus more on the
conduct of the non-bank assignee rather than the national bank that originated the non-usurious loan under the NBA. 85 This cannot be relied upon
as precedent. This standard would produce even more confusing results
because the precedent of the application of the NBA in the courts would be
completely overturned to accommodate a statutory interpretation that
would go against Congressional intent. 86 If the Second Circuit had applied
the NBA as the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had
applied it in Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Lattimore Land
Corporation, then “[t]he non-usurious character of a note should not
change when the note changes hands.” 87
While the Solicitor General agreed with this principal in its brief to the
U.S. Supreme Court, they noted that the court in Lattimore dealt with a set
of facts dissimilar to the ones in Madden and, therefore, the court’s opinion
in Lattimore would not constitute a split between the Fifth Circuit and the
Second Circuit. 88 However, the government’s unwillingness to
acknowledge any split among circuit courts, regardless of how shallow the
circuit split may be, should be swamped by the sheer importance of the
question presented and errors in applying the principle of the NBA by the
Second Circuit. 89
The second case the Second Circuit dismissed was the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit’s holding in Krispin v. May Department Stores in 2000. In Krispin, a department store issued credit cards
to customers with late fees and delinquency rates subject to Missouri state
83. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d at 253.
84. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 62, at 15.
85. Id. at 35.
86. Barnett Bank of Marion Cty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 33 (1996).
87. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Lattimore Land Corp., 656 F.2d 139, 148–49 (5th Cir. 1981).
88. United States brief, supra note 24, at 17.
89. Supplemental Brief for the Petitioners at 8, Midland Funding, LLC v. Madden, 786 F.3d 246
(2d Cir. 2015) (No. 15-00610).
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usury laws. 90 Those delinquent rates were charged off by the department
store to the May National Bank of Arizona—a national bank and wholly
owned subsidiary of May Department Stores—with delinquency limits as
allowed under Arizona state law. 91 The store had assigned all of its interest
in the credit card accounts to the bank. 92 The court agreed with the store
that the store was acting as an assignee and the real interest in the credit
card accounts was transferred to the bank. 93 Therefore, the court held that
the agreement between the store and the bank effectuated an assignment of
a contractual right and the bank, under the NBA, was allowed to charge up
to the state usury rate of the state where it was located. 94 The bank then
changed the interest rate on the credit card agreements, notified the customers of the change, and later re-assigned the accounts back to the store. 95
In determining the application of the NBA, the court in Krispin focused on the originating entity that set the terms of the contract by stating
that “the store’s purchase of the bank’s receivables does not diminish the
fact that it is now the bank, and not the store, that. . .sets such terms as interest and late fees.” 96 Thus, per the court’s reasoning, the entity that sets
the contractual terms maintains an interest in the accounts. 97 In Madden,
the contractual terms, including a twenty-seven percent interest rate, were
set by a national bank acting under the guarantees of the NBA and Delaware law. 98
The appellant in Madden argued that the circumstances in Krispin
were different because in Krispin not only were the banks and the subsidiaries related by corporate structure, but also the bank in Krispin had maintained some interest in the debt. 99 The appellant also argued that other
courts have limited the application of the NBA in cases of assignment to
only those circumstances where the national bank, as had been done in
Krispin, maintained “some ongoing, legally cognizable interest” in the
transferred accounts or where the national bank is “legally or operationally
related to the assignor.” 100 The difference between the appellee’s assertion
that an interest remains when the non-bank entity is enforcing terms origi90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

Krispin v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 218 F.3d 919, 921–22 (8th Cir. 2000).
Id. at 921.
Id. at 922.
Id. at 923.
Id. at 924.
Brief for Defendants-Appellees, supra note 68, at 11.
May Dep’t Stores Co., 218 F.3d at 924.
Id.
Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246, 248 (2d Cir. 2015).
Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 62, at 26.
Id. at 5.
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QDWHG E\ D QDWLRQDO EDQN DQG WKH DSSHOODQW¶V DVVHUWLRQ WKDW WKH EDQN PXVW
KDYHDOHJDOLQWHUHVWLQWKHGHEWFROOHFWLRQLVWKHNH\XQGHUVWDQGLQJWRWKH
6HFRQG&LUFXLW¶VRSLQLRQ
7KH 6HFRQG &LUFXLW VHHPHG WR DJUHH ZLWK WKH DSSHOODQW WKDW WKH FLU
FXPVWDQFHVLQKrispin ZHUHQRWWKHVDPHDVLQMadden. 7KHFRXUWUHDVRQHG
WKDWWKHEDQNLQKrispin KDGPDLQWDLQHGDUHDOLQWHUHVWLQWKHDFFRXQWVDQG
WKHUHIRUH LPSOLFDWHG WKH 1%$ %\ WKH 6HFRQG &LUFXLW¶V DQG WKH DSSHO
ODQW¶V UHDVRQLQJ ZHUH LW QRW IRU WKH EDQN¶V FRQWLQXHG LQWHUHVW LQ WKH DF
FRXQWVWKH1%$ZRXOGQRWKDYHEHHQLPSOLFDWHGDQGWKHDFFRXQWVZRXOG
EHVXEMHFWWRVWDWHXVXU\ODZV7KLVFRQFOXVLRQLVEDVHGRQWKH6HFRQG&LU
FXLW¶VDQDO\VLVWKDWLIWKHEDQNGRHVQRWKDYHDOHJDOLQWHUHVWLQWKHDFFRXQWV
WKHQVXEMHFWLQJWKHGHEWSXUFKDVHUWRVWDWHXVXU\ODZVDQGLJQRULQJIHGHUDO
SUHHPSWLRQZRXOGQRWVLJQLILFDQWO\LQWHUIHUHZLWKWKHH[HUFLVHRIWKHEDQN¶V
SRZHUV7KXVWKH6HFRQG&LUFXLW¶VKROGLQJZRXOGVHHPWRUHVWHQWLUHO\
RQ ZKHWKHU WKH DSSOLFDWLRQ RI VWDWH XVXU\ ODZ VLJQLILFDQWO\ LQWHUIHUHV ZLWK
WKHQDWLRQDOEDQN¶VSRZHUV
(YHQWKRXJKWKH6HFRQG&LUFXLWVDZWKHFRXUW¶VKROGLQJLQKrispin DV
DQLVVXHRILQWHUIHUHQFHWKHFRXUWLQKrispin VDZLWDVDFRQWUDFWXDOULJKW
RI DVVLJQPHQW JLYLQJ ZHLJKW WR WKH SDUW\ ZLWK WKH UHDO LQWHUHVW LQ WKH DF
FRXQW 7KH VSHFLILF KROGLQJ RI Krispin LV WKDW ³FRQVXPHU FUHGLW DJUHH
PHQWV GR QRW ORVH WKH SURWHFWLRQV RI WKH 1%$ ZKHQ DVVLJQHG WR QRQ
1DWLRQDO%DQNV´7KLVKROGLQJZDVUHDIILUPHGE\WKH8QLWHG6WDWHV'LV
WULFW&RXUWIRUWKH'LVWULFWRI0LQQHVRWDLQMunoz v. Pipestone Financial,
LLC ZKHUHWKHFRXUWKHOGWKDW³VWDWHODZXVXU\FODLPVDJDLQVWWKHSXUFKDVHU
RIFUHGLWFDUGGHEWIURPDQDWLRQDOEDQNDUHSUHHPSWHG´7KHKROGLQJRI
KrispinWRJHWKHUZLWKRWKHUFDVHODZLQFOXGLQJMunozSURYLGHVWKHEDVLV
IRU WKH GHWHUPLQDWLRQ WKDW WKH 1%$ DSSOLHV HYHQ GXULQJ D FRQWUDFWXDO DV
VLJQPHQW6LPLODUWRWKHFLUFXPVWDQFHVLQMaddenZKHUH³WKHRULJLQDWLQJ
HQWLW\ TXDOLILHV IRU 1%$ SUHHPSWLRQ WKLV LV QRW ORVW ZKHQ WKH 1DWLRQDO
%DQNDVVLJQVWKHDFFRXQW´
7KHFRQFOXVLRQE\WKH6HFRQG&LUFXLWUHVWVRQWKHVHFRQGLVVXHUDLVHG
LQ Madden ZKHWKHU RU QRW DSSO\LQJ VWDWH XVXU\ ODZV ZRXOG VLJQLILFDQWO\

  Midland Funding, LLC)GDW
  Id. DW±
  See id.
  .ULVSLQY0D\'HS¶W6WRUHV&R)G± WK&LU 
  Brief for Defendants-Appellees, supra QRWHDW
  3HWLWLRQIRU :ULW RI&HUWLRUDUL0LGODQG)XQGLQJ//&Y 0DGGHQ 6&W 1R
 0XQR]Y3LSHVWRQH)LQ//&)6XSSG '0LQQ 
  Brief for Defendants-Appellees, supra QRWHDW
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interfere with the exercise of a national bank’s powers as protected by the
NBA.
C. Do State Usury Laws “Significantly Interfere” with a National
Bank’s Powers?
A national bank’s ability to make and sell loans has been a fundamental focus of banking to facilitate market demand for loans as well as to
price for and spread the risk that any one of the possible loans enters default. The Second Circuit seems to misinterpret, or worse, misunderstand
the intent of “significantly interfere.” The appellant noted that because the
differences between the NBA and the state usury laws raise a conflict
preemption issue, the only way that the federal law may preempt the state
law is when the two laws are incompatible or the state law significantly
impairs the federal law. 108 This is the basis for the question of whether or
not application of state law “significantly interferes” with the NBA’s grant
of rights and duties to the bank. If the application of the state usury law
would significantly interfere with the national bank’s powers then the state
law will be preempted. 109 However, the determination that a state regulation significantly interferes with a federal power is an affirmative defense
and it places the burden of proof on the defendant, or Midland Funding in
this case. 110
The Second Circuit stated, “[Midland Funding] did not act on behalf
of [Bank of America] or FIA in attempting to collect on Madden’s debt.
The defendants acted solely on their own behalves, as the owners of the
debt.” 111 The appellant in Madden relied on this distinction and pointed to
the U.S. Supreme Court’s holding in Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson
that stated the NBA sets forth the limits on national banks, but says nothing
about non-bank entities. 112 However, even though Midland Funding was
not acting as a subsidiary or agent of the bank in collecting on the debt it
purchased, the U.S. Supreme Court has also suggested that the federal
preemption provision of the NBA may extend beyond the national bank
itself so long as the non-national bank entity is acting as the “equivalent to

108. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 62, at 13–14.
109. Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Burke, 414 F.3d 305, 314 (2d Cir. 2005).
110. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 62, at 14; Zink v. First Niagara Bank, N.A., 18
F.Supp.3d 363, 367 (W.D.N.Y. 2014).
111. Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 2015).
112. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 62, at 15; Beneficial Nat’l Bank v. Anderson, 539
U.S. 1, 9 (2003).
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national banks with respect to powers exercised under federal law.” 113 This
preemption protection is meant to provide the non-national bank entity the
ability to act as the national bank so that the national bank’s abilities are
not inhibited by state laws restricting the entity’s actions.
At least one practical benefit to this right of preemption is that, as was
done by Bank of America, national banks often assign their debt collections
to third parties to outsource this branch of their business so it can focus on
its mandate to offer credit to consumers. This not only benefits the banks,
but also benefits the lending market because outsourcing facilitates specialization and specialization facilitates efficiency. 114
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Olvera
v. Blitt & Gaines, P.C. expanded on this premise in determining whether or
not an assignee of a debt could charge the same interest that a licensed loan
originator could charge even though the rate was higher than the state usury
laws allowed. 115 The assignee was a debt collection agency that specialized
in collecting bad debts. 116 The court held that the debt collection agency
was able to charge the higher rate because the common law of assignment
allows the assignee to step into the shoes of the assignor. 117 The court stated that holding an assignee liable to the state usury rate would “be to make
the credit market operate less efficiently,” which the court was reluctant to
adopt. 118
Indeed, the Second Circuit noted that it is possible that usury laws
would negatively impact the market for these loans by reducing the interest
rate banks would be able to charge on these loans, but the Second Circuit
swiftly dismissed these ramifications by stating that the effect would not
significantly interfere with the exercise of a national bank’s powers. 119 The
Second Circuit was concerned that “extending [NBA] protections to third
parties would create an end-run around usury laws.” 120 Therefore, the court
was more concerned with the policy implications of extending this preemption rather than protecting the bank’s exercise of “all such incidental pow-

113. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d at 250 (quoting Watters v. Wachovia Bank, N.A., 550 U.S.
1, 18 (2007)).
114. Olvera v. Blitt & Gaines, P.C., 431 F.3d 285, 288 (7th Cir. 2005).
115. Id. at 286–87.
116. Id. at 286.
117. Id. at 288–89.
118. Id. at 288.
119. Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 2015).
120. Id. at 252.
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ers as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking.” 121 This implication goes against the Congressional intent of the NBA. 122
The U.S. Supreme Court held in Barnett Bank N.A. v. Nelson that the
NBA, a federal statute, explicitly grants a national bank authorization, permission, or power with no indication that Congress intended the national
bank to be subject to local restrictions. 123 The Court further explained that
normally Congress would not want the States to forbid or impair significantly the exercise of a right that Congress explicitly granted. 124 Because
the state law may significantly interfere with a national bank’s exercise of
its powers even if it does so indirectly, the level of interference that gives
rise to preemption is “not very high.” 125
However, the Second Circuit seems to have decided that states can
limit this exercise of power whenever a national bank relinquishes an interest in the loan and that this practice does not significantly interfere with the
national bank’s powers. The Second Circuit stated that subjecting third
party debt purchaser activities to state usury laws would not “significantly
interfere” with loan sales by banks. 126 But the court disregards the marketability of those types of loans compared to loans sold by state chartered
banks specifically subject to state usury laws.
Perhaps the Second Circuit’s decision was motivated by an elevation
of consumer protection standards over the established authorities of national banks. If so, the Second Circuit’s policy implications are misguided.
Consumer protection is clearly a significant concern for the court, especially in enforcing the FDCPA, 127 but these third-party purchasers do not offer
credit to consumers, nor do they set the terms of the agreements. 128 If the
debtors agree to the terms of the loan with the originator (i.e. the national
bank), then the debtor should be held to those agreed upon terms of such
contracts, regardless of whether or not the debt is, or may be, assigned to
another party. The debtor could hardly believe that the interest rates would

121. 12 U.S.C. § 24 (2006).
122. Barnett Bank of Marion Cty., N.A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25, 33 (1996).
123. Id. at 34–35.
124. Id. at 33.
125. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Midland Funding, LLC v. Madden, 136 S.Ct. 2505 (No. 1500610) (quoting Monroe Retail, Inc. v. RBS Citizens, N.A., 589 F.3d 274, 283 (6th Cir. 2009)).
126. Madden v. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 2015).
127. See generally 15 U.S.C.S. § 1692(e) (Lexis 2016) (“It is the purpose of this title to eliminate
abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from
using abusive debt collection practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent
State action to protect consumers against debt collection abuses.”).
128. Olvera v. Blitt & Gaines, P.C., 431 F.3d 285, 289 (7th Cir. 2005).
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plummet if the contract exchanged hands. 129 If consumer protection were to
be raised to the level of the Second Circuit’s opinion, then national banks
would likely simply stop making these loans to high-risk debtors, so that
they could minimize their lending risk.
Fewer banks would be willing to offer loans to customers within the
New York area because the loans could not be resold at the competitive
rate of interest and, therefore, would be kept on the bank’s balance sheets
or sold with an uncompetitive interest rate. A requirement to maintain the
loans on the national bank’s accounts implicates national bank capital requirements, which require the bank to maintain certain levels of liquidity in
accordance with the assets and liabilities held by the bank. The ability to
sell off defaulting or troublesome loans allows the bank the ability to remain within its capital requirements and to lend to more individuals.
Furthermore, there is a concern over the impact to credit risk now that
the bank is liable for collecting these outstanding debts. The risk of defaulting on a loan is now something that could directly impact the liquidity and
other financials of the bank. Banks often use the secondary market to adjust
risk exposures. Where loans have already defaulted, the bank can sell off
the loan to the secondary market quickly and balance its risk; however,
with the precedent set in Madden, the bank’s ability to manage its risk in
case of default presents another concern for the regulators. 130
Although the Second Circuit may be trying to protect consumers from
usurious interest rates, the court has presented a new problem: lack of
available credit. This policy choice would, in fact, significantly interfere
with a national bank’s power by forcing them to comply with individual
state usury laws and then be forced to only sell that loan to that state or
another state with similar usury rates. The national banks would be forced
to either reduce the amount it charges on its interest—an action the Second
Circuit stated would not significantly interfere with the bank’s powers 131—
or make fewer loans above the state usury rates, which would significantly
disrupt the national market. Either way, this decision significantly interferes with the national bank’s powers entrusted to it by Congress.

129. Id.
130. See ABA brief, supra note 14, at 13–14.
131. Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d at 251.
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IV. IMPLICATIONS GOING FORWARD
A. Impact on the Banks
The court’s decision in Madden chills the secondary market and goes
directly against Congressional intent to allow banks to liquefy their debt
and make new loans to new consumers. 132 The Second Circuit did address
some concern that usury laws may prevent banks from carrying out their
lending powers, 133 but the court stated that the usury laws would not “significantly interfere” with the powers of the national banks. 134 However, if a
bank cannot sell a loan according to its terms without being subject to criminal usury penalties then the usury laws have significantly interfered with
the powers of national banks. Indeed, a potential debt-buyer could be subject to criminal usury laws in New York if that person “knowingly charges . . . at a rate exceeding 25% per annum.” 135 The looming threat of
criminal charges has halted the purchase of these loans until the doctrine of
federal preemption has been reviewed and some certainty is granted.
The appellant in Madden argued that the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank”) had attempted to narrow the scope of national bank’s powers by adding Section 25(b) into Title
12 of the United States Code, which outlines the specific preemption standards. 136 These standards again include the significantly interfere test set out
in Barnett Bank and considers any discriminatory effects on national
banks. 137 The appellant states that “Congress had expressed concern that,
through its excessively broad preemption positions, the OCC had ‘actively
created an environment where abusive mortgage lending could flourish
without State controls.’” 138 And, indeed, Dodd-Frank did authorize states to
bring lawsuits against national banks for violating the NBA and restricted
the federal preemption of national banks to only state consumer finance
laws that regulate financial accounts. 139 However, nowhere in Section 25(b)

132. ABA brief, supra note 14, at 3.
133. See Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 251.
134. ABA brief, supra note 14, at 6 (quoting Midland Funding, LLC, 786 F.3d 251).
135. N.Y. PENAL § 190.40 (CONSOL. 2015).
136. 12 U.S.C. § 25b(b)(1) (2006).
137. Id.
138. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 62, at 39 (quoting S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 17 (2010)).
139. JOSEPH L. BARLOON ET AL., BANK PREEMPTION AFTER THE DODD-FRANK ACT 4 (Sept 13,
2010),
https://www.skadden.com/sites/default/files/publications/Bank_Preemption_After_the_Dodd_Frank_A
ct_0.pdf; Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1044,
124 Stat. 1376, 2014-17 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 25b (2010)).
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RIWKHFRGHGRHVLWUHSHDO6HFWLRQRI7LWOH²WKH1%$7KH1%$¶V
IHGHUDO SUHHPSWLRQ DQG WKH SUHFHGHQW XSKROGLQJ SUHHPSWLRQ ZHUH ODUJHO\
OHIW LQ SODFH DIWHU 'RGG)UDQN )XUWKHUPRUH 'RGG)UDQN SUHVHUYHG WKH
SURYLVLRQV RI WKH 1%$ WKDW DOORZV D QDWLRQDO EDQN WR H[SRUW LWV LQWHUHVW
UDWHVIURPLWVKRPHVWDWH
(YHQ WKRXJK&RQJUHVV LQHQDFWLQJ 'RGG)UDQN ZDV FRQFHUQHG ZLWK
FRQVXPHU SURWHFWLRQ ODZV WKH ODZV VXSSRUWLQJ WKH HIIHFWLYHQHVV RI WKH
1%$IHGHUDOSUHHPSWLRQZHUHPDLQWDLQHG'HVSLWHWKLVWKH6HFRQG&LUFXLW
H[SDQGHG WKH PLQRU DPHQGPHQWV WR WKH 1%$ WR SUHFOXGH D VWDQGDUG RI
H[SRUWLQJ LQWHUHVW UDWHV DQG DVVLJQLQJ WKH ULJKWV RI WKH FUHGLWRU WR D QRQ
EDQN 7KH LPSDFW UHDFKHV IDUWKHU WKDQ WKH 6HFRQG &LUFXLW PXVW KDYH FRQ
VLGHUHGDVEDQNVQRWRQO\UHO\RQWKHVHFRQGDU\PDUNHWVWRVHOOGHIDXOWLQJ
GHEWEXWDOVRWRVHFXULWL]HORDQVDQGPDNHDGGLWLRQDOFUHGLWDYDLODEOH
B. Effect on the Lending Market
$VDUHVXOWRIWKLVGHFLVLRQQDWLRQDOEDQNVORFDWHGZLWKLQWKH6HFRQG
&LUFXLW¶VMXULVGLFWLRQPD\EHGHWHUUHGIURPPDNLQJORDQVEHFDXVHWKHORDQV
ZLOO EH VXEMHFW WR VWDWH XVXU\ ODZV VKRXOG WKH\ EH VROG WR WKH VHFRQGDU\
PDUNHW 7KH 6HFRQG &LUFXLW¶V GHFLVLRQ PDNHV WKRVH ORDQV OHVV YDOXDEOH
EHFDXVH WKHUH ZLOO EH D VPDOOHU DQG OHVV SURVSHURXV PDUNHW )HZHU ORDQ
SXUFKDVHUVZRXOGEHZLOOLQJWRDJUHHWRFRQWUDFWXDOWHUPVWKDWZRXOGQRZ
EHGHHPHGXVXULRXVDQGWKXVIDFHFULPLQDOSHQDOWLHVIRUDJUHHLQJWRHQIRUFH
WKHFRQWUDFW7KLVDOVRPHDQVWKDWIHZHUFRQVXPHUVZRXOGEHDEOHWRHQMR\
WKHDFWLYHOHQGLQJPDUNHWDVLWZDVEHIRUHWKHMaddenGHFLVLRQ7KLVULVNRI
XQFHUWDLQW\ ZLOO LQGLUHFWO\ LPSDFW KLJKULVN ORZLQFRPH LQGLYLGXDOV DQG
VPDOOEXVLQHVVHVWKDWGHSHQGKHDYLO\RQEDQNILQDQFLQJ7KHHIIHFWZLOO
EHSDUWLFXODUO\KDUVKLQUHDOHVWDWHFRPPHUFLDOFUHGLWFDUGDQGDXWRPRELOH
ORDQVZKLFKPDNHXSDPDMRUSDUWRIWKHWULOOLRQOHQGLQJPDUNHWE\QD
WLRQDOEDQNV
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DYDLODEOH
  See ABA brief, supra QRWHDW
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This uncertainty and risk will be gobbled up by the shadow banking
market. Shadow banks are non-bank financial institutions, including broker-dealers, mortgage finance firms, asset-backed commercial paper conduits and money market mutual funds, that offer loans to individual and
institutional borrowers. 147 Shadow banks often offer higher returns for
high-risk loans. Even though there is a market and purpose for these shadow banks, consumer lending may not yet be the best place for them. The
concern is that whereas traditional banks are regulated by the OCC, the
FDIC, and the Federal Reserve System, these shadow banks offering highrisk loans do not have such clear regulatory demarcations. Therefore, the
growth of the shadow banking market in this area may increase the risk to
the whole economy. The years leading up to the 2007–2009 financial crisis
in the United States were characterized by the development of a new set of
financial institutions that formed the so-called shadow banking system. 148
“In fact, the rise in defaults among subprime lenders triggered runs in different shadow banking markets, causing the collapse of most of these unregulated institutions and also affecting the traditional banking system.” 149
In 2013, the Financial Stability Board estimated the total assets of the
shadow banking market at $75 trillion, $5 trillion more than the previous
year. 150 Given the impact of the Second Circuit’s decision, shadow banks
may offer opportunities for consumers who are turned away from traditional banks. This increase in shadow bank lending could destabilize the economy and impact this high-risk lending market in a way the Second Circuit
did not consider.
History has already proven that improper regulation of the secondary
market can create unwarranted friction in the lending market. In 2002, the
state of Georgia passed a statute that imposed unrestricted liability for assignees of certain higher-cost mortgages for any claim that could be asserted against the originator. 151 In response, the rating agencies decided not to
rate the securities that were backed by mortgage loans that were originated
in Georgia. 152 The ill effects of the statute simply removed the evaluation
that the ratings agencies provided on the securities and, therefore, left the
147. Francesco Ferrante, A Model of Endogenous Loan Quality and the Collapse of the Shadow
Banking System, 1 (Fed. Reserve Bd., Finance and Economics Discussion Series, Working Paper No.
2015-21, 2015), http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/feds/2015/files/2015021pap.pdf.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1–2.
150. Id. at 2.
151. Brief of The Clearinghouse Association et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of the Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit at 21, Midland Funding,
LLC v. Madden, No. 15-00610.
152. Id.

674

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol 92:2

investors without any idea of what they were investing in. 153 The ultimate
effect was that the financial institutions refused to buy mortgages that originated in Georgia and the lenders withdrew or limited their operations in
the state until, ultimately, Georgia was forced to amend the statute to limit
assignee liability. 154
C. Solutions
The overall uncertainty of this litigation has concerned not only banks
and other depository institutions, but also hedge funds, securitization vehicles, buyers of defaulted debt, purchasers of whole loans, and those who
purchase loans originated by banks, especially those who are now in possession of usurious loans. Two options moving forward include having the
originating bank maintain an interest in the loan or amending the current
agreements to comply with individual state usury laws. 155
As determined in Krispin, if the bank maintains an interest in the loan,
the loan may be protected by the NBA and not deemed usurious. 156 The
dueling precedential definitions of “interest” are at odds though, which
creates uncertainty as to whether the bank maintains an interest. On one
end, the bank may be required to maintain a “legally cognizable interest,” 157 and on the other end the interest is automatically maintained
throughout the life of the loan because it is the bank that “sets such terms as
interest and late fees.” 158 The latter definition would continue to favor national banks federal preemption power while the former definition would
cause banks to maintain these loans on their books either in whole or in
part.
Indeed, Lending Club, the largest marketplace lending platform in the
United States, altered its operations after the Second Circuit’s decision.
Lending Club stated that it incorporated a new “enhanced program structure” whereby the bank will maintain an ongoing economic interest in any
loan that it originates and sells to the secondary market until the borrowers
make all the payments on the loan. This transition by one of the biggest

153. Id.
154. Id. at 22.
155. PAUL HASTINGS, MADDEN V MIDLAND FUNDING, LLC: POTENTIALLY FAR-REACHING
IMPLICATIONS FOR NON-BANK ASSIGNEES OF BANK-ORIGINATED LOANS 3 (Aug. 12, 2015),
http://www.paulhastings.com/docs/default-source/PDFs/stay-current-madden-v-midlandfunding34064e66923346428811cff00004cbded.pdf.
156. Krispin v. May Dep’t Stores Co., 218 F.3d 919, 924 (8th Cir. 2000).
157. Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 62, at 5.
158. May Dep’t Stores Co., 218 F.3d at 924.
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marketplace lending platforms may lead to accounting issues for the bank
that now must maintain the loan on its balance sheet. 159
The industry has also been advised by law firms to review its loan
portfolios for any loans within the Second Circuit’s jurisdiction, including
the financial capital of the United States, New York, and to understand the
potential civil and criminal penalties they may be exposed to because of the
now usurious nature of their loans. 160 They may need to renegotiate the
terms of the loans and bring the loan’s interest rates under the state usury
requirement or just maintain those loans on its books and make fewer
loans. However, problems lie at the heart of both solutions. Litigation from
plaintiffs’ attorneys may run rampant because of this decision and it may
require loans under the Second Circuit’s jurisdiction to be amended to
comply with state usury laws, thereby increasing the risk to national banks.
As in the lead up to the 2008 financial crisis, increased risk to high risk
debtors could lead to higher speculation and overall uncertainty in the marketplace.
Additionally, forcing banks to maintain the loans on their balance
sheet would decrease the ability of banks to lend to creditworthy borrowers
because increases in capital requirements have set higher standards to ensure a bank’s liquidity. For example, in July of 2015, the Federal Reserve
approved a new rule that took effect on January 1, 2016 and forces eight
major banks to “hold additional capital to increase its resiliency in light of
the greater threat it poses to the financial stability of the United States.” 161
This rule forces these banks to “either hold substantially more capital, reducing the likelihood that they will fail, or . . . shrink their systemic footprint.” 162 This rule was made in continuance of Dodd-Frank’s requirements
for minimum risk-based capital reserves for those insured depository institutions. 163 Because banks must remain in compliance with these requirements, a national bank’s abilities would be limited in the amount of lending
they could undertake if they had to maintain such loans on their balance
sheets.

159. JD Alois, Lending Club Reacts to Concerns Over Madden vs. Midland Decision,
CROWDFUND INSIDER (Feb. 26, 2016), http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2016/02/82246-lending-clubreacts-to-concerns-over-madden-vs-midland-decision/.
160. See Ornstein et al., supra note 18, at 3.
161. Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal Reserve Board approves
final rule to hold additional capital to increase its resiliency (July 20, 2015),
https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20150720a.htm.
162. Id.
163. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §
171(b)(2), 124 Stat. 1376, 1436 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5371).
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9&21&/86,21
7KH6HFRQG&LUFXLW¶VKROGLQJWKDWIHGHUDOSUHHPSWLRQXQGHUWKH1%$
GLG QRW DSSO\ LQ Madden KDV VLJQLILFDQWO\ LPSDFWHG WKH PDUNHWDELOLW\ RI
ORDQVRULJLQDWHGE\QDWLRQDOEDQNVDQGWKXVLQWHUIHUHGZLWKWKHDXWKRULW\RI
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To avoid this downfall and mitigate economic risk, federal preemption
under the NBA should remain in full force. Hopefully, other courts will
appropriately examine the congressional intent behind Section 85 of Title
12 of the United States Code and the Second Circuit will uphold that intent
in the future. Until the U.S. Supreme Court recognizes a split among the
jurisdictions, we are left to reorganize a standard practice that is 150 years
old.

